The internal power struggle and the peace in the Gulf

A quagmire with an uncertain finale

 The Iranian parliament opened at last on July 15,; after being  closed since the start of the war with the USA. The opening of the parliament has been one of the demands of the MPs, from all sides of the political spectrum, especially the opponents of the new JCPOA which has been called the MoU by the Trump Administration, the sitting reformist administration and by the go-between stakeholders; the Pakistanis and the Qataris.

 The opening of the House was followed by taking up a few resolutions, of which one about the end of the MoU between Iran and the USA was adopted overwhelmingly. It is pertinent to note that the parliament is empowered to adopt or reject any pacts with the foreign governments; whose definition covers, practically any new JCPOA, which was the intent of even the Raeesi government or the MoU enthusiastically followed by the incumbent reformist administration.

 The opening of the parliament and the shift of opposition to the MoU from the street to the floor of the House, was one of the thorny issues between the dissenting MPs and the speaker of the Iranian parliament Baqir Qalibaf, who being the co-negotiator along with the reformist foreign minister, was criticized for adjourning the parliament session for too long; a move which was criticized by the opponents of the MoU on the plea that this move sabotages the House’s role in important national issues, while the reformist former mayor of the capital city during the tenure of President Khatami, now a veteran politician, was all praise for the speaker arguing that a closed parliament was a blessing for the MoU to be signed finally, in whatever form.

 They misconstrued the reform vote and felt that the street would help them. It proved to be the contrary. Going forward, the battlefield which has been going on for almost two weeks  and has the potential to climb the escalatory ladder; will decide which faction will have the upper hand.  That faction will consequently decide what is the fate of Hormuz; to Trump’s satisfaction or for the free world

However, neither side was sitting idle. If the radicals were able to pass a resolution annulling the MOU, the speaker secretariat recomposed the security committee body of the House and shunted out what were thought to be radical members. If that move was a blow to the radical elements on one side, it was a bad departure from the traditions followed in Iran after the revolution.

Despite the fact that the 2009 elections in Iran created a wedge between the reform movement and the leadership, the then expediency committee was composed evenly and had many prominent reformist names in the ranks like Muhammad Raza Aref, not to forget the late Iranian president Rafsanjani; himself the doyen of the reformists/pro-West group; even when the reformist presidential hopeful Mir Hossain Mousavi was under the house arrest during the same time.

 The fact that the state broadcasting chief is selected by the leadership and for obvious reasons the IRIB editorial was not comfortable with the winds of change; the pro-US slant despite facing the US aggression, the editorial criticism was point blank criticized by the president; which in a way pitted the IRGC and the leadership against the reformist administration for the third-party observer to reach certain conclusions.

 As is evident, the battle lines within the Iranian political spectrum or the corridors of power are getting clearer with every passing day. It would not be out of context to say that the timeline of the Iranian stances after February 28, the assassination list, the periodic utterances or ‘disclosures’ by US President Donald Trump, the slow entry of the negotiators, mostly from the US camp, namely Pakistan and Qatar, all indicate the hard fact that the fissures within the Iranian polity were created there and then.

 Two weeks into the war few days after the annual Ramazan Quds rally in the capital Tehran, the national security advisor Ali Larijani, who on account of his credentials and profile could have been a harder nut to crack whenever the negotiations were to be held, was targeted on the basis of the intelligence-based information and the IDF/USAF jets were deployed to do the needful.

 His killing was lamented by a very pertinent comment that the USA was killing people who could have been an asset in the negotiation process which usually follows any armed conflict. It was precisely that time when the Pakistani media in cahoots with the international media created an impression that people within the corridors of power in Iran were ready to talk. That was coupled with assertions by Trump that there were ‘saner Iranians’ wanting to talk, while there were many who would not like to get into any conversation, he added.

 In the Iranian media and also in the international and Pakistani media, especially the sections and journalists with links to the deep state in Rawalpindi/Islamabad, there were indications that it was not only the president of the reform government or the foreign minister who were prepared to talk with Pakistan as a fixer of the meeting, but the speaker of the parliament Qalibaf was the surprise dark horse, in all that talk. A career IRGC hand, having fought the eight-year war with Iraq in the 1980s, having commanded various branches of the IRGC, he was an unlikely person to be found among the people who will be talking to the USA directly or indirectly.

 The profile of anyone talking to the USA is suspect in the eyes of the most common and poorest an Iranian since the days of Mossadeq; has been suspect, and that was the case with the speaker of the assembly. A video going viral in Iran, where the speaker of the majlis sitting stern among the dignitaries in Imam Raza shrine at the time of the burial of Khamenei, with ‘death to the conspirators’ slogans being chanted by the crowd in the background, seems to encapsulate the street sentiment and the stances taken by a faction of the Iranian establishment.

 These stances precisely now divide the Iranian nation. While in Qatar the Iranian foreign minister had to make up an argument that the military responses were very much automated and not within the control of the political leadership. In fact in an embarrassment he was trying to explain that the part of establishment, inclusive of the elusive leader Mujtaba Khamenei, the IRGC and the other hawks in the system were not in favor of talking to the USA, while the reformist government and the parliament speaker were for negotiations, at whatever terms they are finalized.

 The root of the problem in a way also lies in the fact that is gauged by the remarks from Trump, that a section of the Iranian government is seeking to talk to him and he usually makes these remarks in a very humiliating manner.  The radicals feel that the negotiations are not a normal one, rather a desperate one. The remarks by Mujtaba giving a conditional approval to the MoU itself means that the reformist government is not firmly on its feet in the street, in the newly developing Bayat Rahbari, in the parliament or amongst the opinion makers.

 So, the lasting peace in the strait of Hormuz is not in the hands of the fixers of peace or the CENTCOM, rather it is the Iranian street, the floor of the House and the upper hand of whichever faction in the Iranian establishment which is going to decide the fate of the geopolitical quagmire.’

 As things stand, the reformists despite having a setback at the street level, which energized the parliament, the reason being the week-long burial ceremonies for the late supreme leader, are trying to regroup and again seek an audience with the USA. Ironically the US insistence on its military supremacy with complete disregard to its media imagery has made things difficult for the reformists on ground in Iran.

 The nocturnal strikes on military targets on reciprocal basis between 00:00 to 05:00 hours Middle East standard time between the CENTCOM and IRGC; besides the attack on rail network on the day of the burial of the supreme leader all tend to radicalize the street. Here the reformists seem to have miscalculated the level of support for the slain leader.

 They misconstrued the reform vote and felt that the street would help them. It proved to be the contrary. Going forward, the battlefield which has been going on for almost two weeks  and has the potential to climb the escalatory ladder; will decide which faction will have the upper hand.  That faction will consequently decide what is the fate of Hormuz; to Trump’s satisfaction or for the free world.