In the footsteps of the Imam

Today is Ashura

AT PENPOINT

It is said often enough that Imam Hussain offered his own sacrifice as an example, to ensure that the religion of his grandfather (Peace Be Upon Him) was not usurped. But that somehow obscures the fact that he provided an example of what a Muslim is to do when the Caliphate has been usurped.

This lesson becomes all the more relevant today, because of the attack that was carried out by the USA on a state dedicated to the Imam’s sacrifice, the only Islamic Shia state in the world. That state showed that it was possible to do what many had said was impossible: resist the USA. Now there has been a ceasefire, and it seems the USA has backed down, but at one time, when US President Donald Trump threatened that ‘an entire civilization will die’, it did seem that the entire Iranian people had reached their Karbala, and it was going to be nuclear.

However, another view would be that Iran’s recent ordeal had nothing to do with the Imam’s, for it was to do with resisting foreign intervention, while the Imam’s problem was essentially internal, to do with the state, rather than with the international situation.

Iran may have had to take on the Gulf monarchies, but they treated them as fellow Muslims (despite the sharp sectarian differences), On the other hand, their main opponents were the USA and Israel. The Imam’s main opponent was another Muslim. The surrounding non-Muslims were so weak and so distant that the Bani Umayya did not call them in for help.

The problem which faced the Imam was simple: Yazid had not properly contracted the Caliphate, because the bai’a, or oath of allegiance, he had received was not freely given. Ever since the death of Imam Hassan, the Caliph Muawiya had tried to obtain the bai’a in advance for his son Yazid, and even visited Madina to obtain it from the senior companions of the Prophet, including those who had been Companions of the Prophet (PBUH), which he failed to do.

Thus Yazid’s assumption of the Caliphate was a usurpation, and it had not been filled properly in the first place. The Imam had to decide what to do. He had to restore the Caliphate, and he had to either declare allegiance to some third person, or put himself forward.

This was not a matter of ambition. It was a situation like when the time for a congregational prayer begins to pass, but the imam has not arrived. One of the congregants leads the prayer. The analogy is exact, for the words ‘caliph’ and ‘imam’ were used interchangeably. And indeed, there is the example of the Caliph Umar, who was attacked and stabbed while leading the Fajr prayer: after the initial confusion, one of the congregants came forward and completed the prayer.

While Iran and the Sunni states have strong theological differences over the caliphate, the practicalities are now too strong to ignore, and the need for a unifying principle has now been thrust in the face of the Ummah. Will it rise to the challenge?

The Imam told Muawiya to his face that Yazid drank, but that was probably not why he refused the bai’a when the time came. It was probably because it was being forced upon him. He had told Muawiya, when he had come to Madinah to meet the Imam and other Companions, that he would follow the Muslims as they decided after Muawiya, which showed the understanding that the Caliphate is for the Ummah to dispose, and if anyone takes the Caliphate without the right to do so, he is guilty of the same crime as a member of a qabza group, and vacating that illegal occupation is to be carried out by force if necessary.

Now those who can vacate possession from a qabza group are the owners, or the authorities. In the same way, if the Caliphate is to be vacated, it is by the rightful possessors of the Caliph’s authority, which is the Ummah. And that means any member of the Ummah. It is lonely enough a furrow to plough, but the Imam accepted that the task had to be performed.

Therefore, to say that the Imam’s action was political does not carry any implication of selfishness. It is also to be noted that he was virtually driven to his action, being first told to give the bai’a in Madina, and then when he moved to Makkah, being importuned there. He only went to Kufa when he received letters from the men of Kufa inviting him to take the Caliphate.

The stage had been set for the tragedy of Karbala, but it is also noteworthy that the Imam never claimed on the basis of his descent from the Holy Prophet (PBUH). He squarely based his claim on his adherence to the Sharia, as well as his expertise in it; in sharp contrast to Yazid. The support of people, freely given, was also a point in his favour.

His similarity to people today is relevant, though there is a significant difference. He was faced with a Caliphate that was illegally occupied, while today’s Muslim is faced with a Caliphate that has been abolished. In both cases, though, there is a vacancy to be filled. Unlike him, Muslims are not faced with the problem of a usurper preventing a proper appointment. He proceeded to follow the logic, which was to work for vacation of the usurpation.

Those who give the bai’a must do so with rida and Ikhtiyar. That means that they must give the bai’a freely, and they must have a choice. The choice means they must be aware of the various candidates, and must be allowed to vote accordingly. There was no proper choice if the only person who could be chosen was Yazid.

It should not be forgotten that this was a time when those who had been Companions of the Prophet (PBUH) as young men or even boys were now old men, looked up to and respected. They were all older than Yazid, and had a claim to the Caliphate. They were also wary of the hereditary principle which was creeping in. It should not be forgotten that one of the potential caliphs was Abdullah ibn Umar, in his own right a senior Companion, one from whom many traditions are narrated. As his father Umar lay dying after being stabbed, and he was mulling the question of succession, someone had suggested Abdullah ibn Umar. Umar refused, naming a panel of six which excluded him. If the hereditary principle was to be applied, then that was the time.

However, the position is even more different. It is not a question of succession, and whether or not the bai’a has been correctly given or not. The caliphate is presently vacant entirely, indeed has been since the Turkish Grand National Assembly abolished it in 1924. From the point of view of the Ithna Ashariya school, the Caliph will be the Imam, when the Imam Ghaib returns from occlusion. Until then, there is the wilayat-i-Fakih (rule of the jurist), which has been applied since 1979, after the overthrow of the Shah.

The vacancy is of great importance, because it means that the Muslims of the world have split into national entities. The Organisation of Islamic Countries does not substitute itself, because it places the Islamic countries (mostly ex-colonies) within a framework of sovereign equality. However, now that the USA is becoming, along with Israel, an existential threat to Muslim countries, and the recent visit to Pakistan by Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian saw a call for Islamic unity, unity under a caliph is becoming a necessity rather than an option.

While Iran and the Sunni states have strong theological differences over the caliphate, the practicalities are now too strong to ignore, and the need for a unifying principle has now been thrust in the face of the Ummah. Will it rise to the challenge?