A Cycle of Repackaged Reforms?

India's Defence Vision 2047

India’s Defence Vision 2047 has been presented with confidence, built around ideas of ambition, self-reliance, and rapid technological progress. It aims to make India a modern, flexible, and globally important military power on the 100th anniversary of its independence.

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Defence Minister Rajnath Singh have highlighted indigenisation, stronger coordination between the services, and the need to prepare for future warfare as the core of this vision. However, behind this narrative lies a familiar pattern, raising a difficult question: Is Defence Vision 2047 really a break from the past, or is it just another cycle of repackaged reforms?

Bold statements, defence deals, and increased budgets may project momentum, but genuine transformation requires a discipline that continues to elude India. The Vision 2047 appears to be just another benchmark in a long series that looks great on paper but lacks actual substance

The contours of the situation become evident when one reflects on how Indian officials have processed the May 2025 war with Pakistan, recognising the operational and strategic lessons. Gen Anil Chauhan, the Chief of Defence Staff, openly said, "Though there were losses, we rectified our tactics.” This recognition goes beyond just making changes on the battlefield. It shows basic problems with operational planning, lack of coordination, sluggish response, and inconsistent decision-making that have left the military with unresolved problems of joint operations and overall agility.

Marka-e-Haq revealed deep shortcomings in India’s operational structures. Following the battlefield’s hard lessons, General Chauhan’s insistence on swifter decisions and integrated operations highlights a realisation that theatre commands are critical mechanisms, introduced to address the structural frictions that proved damaging on the battlefield. Yet entrenched inter-service differences remain, indicating that recognising the problem is only one step; translating awareness into concrete change remains a formidable challenge for India.

Additionally, the technological inefficiency is clear as day. Indian Air Chief Marshal Amar Preet Singh said at the 22nd Subroto Mukerjee Seminar that India is behind in important areas of technology. This was one of the few instances where Indian leadership openly recognised the operational weaknesses revealed during Marka-e-Haq.

Consequently, drones, electronic warfare, real-time intelligence, and artificial intelligence are being emphasised as the decisive levers of modern warfare under Vision 2047. Likewise, the initiative focuses on strengthening research in niche technologies and enhancing industry-military collaboration through a “Technology Perspective and Capability Roadmap.”

Nevertheless, the practical application of these capabilities will determine their real impact. Past experiences indicate that ambitious plans frequently fail when doctrinal integration misaligns with battlefield realities.

In the wake of the May 2025 war, India sharply increased defence spending to $87 billion for 2026-27, up from $68.3 billion the previous year, alongside a rush of acquisitions, signalling an urgent push to modernise its forces. Chief of Army Staff Gen Upendra Dwivedi further highlighted this need by stressing the retirement of ageing platforms, adoption of network-enabled multi-domain operations, enhancement of communications, and integration of terrain-specific electronic warfare, reflecting an acknowledgement that past approaches were inadequate against Pakistan’s network-centric approach. Yet, despite the focus on ‘Made in India’ and Atmanirbhar Bharat, dependence on imports and setbacks like the Tejas crash highlight that bigger budgets and plans alone cannot translate aspirations into effective operational strength.

On the other hand, Pakistan’s performance in the May war is a striking point of comparison. The PAF implemented MDOs with the use of air, cyber, and electronic warfare, which were effectively combined with disciplined training and mastery of the platform, marking the world’s first practical MDO demonstration. Its J-10C fleet and PL-15 beyond-visual-range missiles were organised effectively, giving the PAF a decisive advantage over a heterogeneous, less integrated IAF fleet. This performance prompted the Indian leadership to face some ugly realities and realign strategic thinking, with Defence Vision 2047 being one of the compensatory measures to restore credibility following a humiliating episode in its operations.

The coordinated MDOs by Pakistan showed that sophisticated platforms only have an impact when combined with near-realistic training, effective doctrine and dependable logistics. India has already learned these lessons, but converting the futuristic strategic plans into operational reality remains a long-standing challenge.

In the past, moments of crisis have triggered bold reform agendas, only for them to lose momentum amid bureaucratic delays and institutional friction. Presently, the higher expenditure and increased pace of acquisitions aimed at overcoming hardware gaps, structural problems in training, doctrine, and integration remain a limiting factor in actual operational performance.

India’s Defence Vision 2047 points to the magnitude of the gap that still exists. India remains behind in joint operations, technological integration, and operational cohesion despite ambitious plans, budget and procurement surges. Pakistan, with its highly precise, rehearsed and integrated operations, already has a clear advantage in operational preparedness and doctrine implementation, whilst the Indian forces continue to be burdened by systemic weaknesses and structural inertia.

Bold statements, defence deals, and increased budgets may project momentum, but genuine transformation requires a discipline that continues to elude India. The Vision 2047 appears to be just another benchmark in a long series that looks great on paper but lacks actual substance.