India’s Strategic Autonomy under Trump 2.O

The article examines the shift in India's strategic autonomy under Trump's National Security Strategy, highlighting the transactional nature of US-India relations and the implications for regional security.

Syeda Tahreem Bukhari

Syeda Tahreem Bukhari

March 25, 2026

4 min read
India’s Strategic Autonomy under Trump 2.O

India’s room for strategic manoeuvre is being limited

The National Security Strategy released by the United States on December 4 under the Trump Administration is transactional in nature under the banner of America First. The previous NSS focused on China and Russia as strategic competitors while the competition repositioned in 2025 where China was treated more as an economic competitor, criticizing previous US policies for opening the market to China as enabler of China’s strategy. Meanwhile, with Russia, the USA prioritizes re-establishing strategic stability.

NSS 2017 prioritized strategic investment on partners and allies, while the recent one redefined the alliance policy, from strategic investment to strategic extraction as Trump expect from its partners and allies to deliver returns. India is an important case study in this regard; it was seen as a “high potential asset.” The official defence cooperation between the US and India began with the signing of “Ten years of Defence Framework Agreement” in 2005. Washington believed that a powerful India would be a crucial counterweight to Chinese influence in the region.

The USA expects from its partners and allies to address the security challenges and share the burden. The strategic partners are subjected to compliance enforcement. The USA has been investing in India for the last two decades; it has now reclassified its partnership from long-term investment to transactional asset as the era of strategic altruism is over and the transactional alignment has commenced

Previous National Security Strategies also defined India as a strategic partner to counter- balance China. The USA invested in India through a variety of agreements across various domains such as defence, trade, economy, space, AI and critical emerging technologies. The National Security Strategy 2025 points towards an end to the era of strategic altruism and the beginning of return on investment. The US invested in India under its strategic partnership and now it is time for India to deliver strategic returns.

The Trump NSS is interest-driven and conditional. The NSS highlights how Trump aims to discipline its allies and partners. It stated, “We will also work to align the actions of our allies and partners with our joint interest in preventing domination by any single competitor nation.” It shows the abrupt change in nature of alliances and partnerships that would be behaviour-contingent, not trust-based. Trump’s coercive economic diplomacy is a test case where India’s purchase of Russian oil was halted by imposition of a 50 percent tariff on India and direct sanctions on Russia’s largest oil companies. Under the guise of strategic autonomy, India previously kept purchasing Russian oil that has spiked from 0.2 percent to 40 percent despite economic sanctions imposed by the USA. The US Trade Advisor Peter Navarro even so far as to refer Russo-Ukrainian conflict as "Modi's war" and said that the "road to peace runs, in part, through New Delhi."

India’s strategic inflexibility gave a clear message to the US that when it counts most it would be autonomous. The NSS implies that India can no longer act autonomously against the US interests. This transition is evident in recent press talk by Trump where he openly claimed that to make him happy India cut down the oil purchase from Russia following the imposition of 50 percent tariff on Indian exports. The tariff on India was reduced to 18 percent after it promised to stop purchasing Russian oil. 

The NSS signals the US strategy of constraining states whom it defined as competitors, through economic war. The tariffs, market access and supply chain would be a weapon of alignment to limit policies that undermine the US objective. The strategic partners and allies are expected to align with US-led economic sanctions, otherwise they will face punitive trade measures including higher tariffs. 

To reduce the tariff imposed by the USA, Modi agreed to stop purchasing Russian oil, showing it had lost the strategic room to manoeuvre. Iran that was defined as an irritant in previous NSS is termed as a “Chief Destabilizing Force” in NSS 2025. Washington recently announced a 25 percent tariff on countries trading with Iran.

While New Delhi is a top export destination for Tehran, the total value of export in 2024 was $1.05 billion. It was also investing in the Chabahar port deal secured in 2024 giving India ten years of access to the port. The recent sanctions left India with no choice but to exit the Chabahar port. India is constrained under Trump 2.O where the US would be defining the trajectory of its multi-alignment policy. 

The US still needs India in the Indo-Pacific region to secure sea-lanes, logistics, and in QUAD. The US has invested in India’s role as a key Indo-Pacific logistic hub through the Master Ship Repair Agreement, concluded in 2023. The NSS requires India and other allies to not only expand their naval capabilities but also contribute to regional security through QUAD.

The USA expects from its partners and allies to address the security challenges and share the burden. The strategic partners are subjected to compliance enforcement. The USA has been investing in India for the last two decades; it has now reclassified its partnership from long-term investment to transactional asset as the era of strategic altruism is over and the transactional alignment has commenced. 

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Syeda Tahreem Bukhari
Syeda Tahreem Bukhari

The writer is Research Officer at Center for International Strategic Studies (CISS), AJK

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