Between Coercion and Conciliation

Pakistan's Dilemma on the Afghan Frontier

By: Aleena Saif Ullah

On February 22, Pakistan's military launched airstrikes at seven locations in the Afghan provinces of Nangarhar and Paktika. The strikes targeted what Islamabad referred to as the hideouts of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) militants. Official statements from the Ministry of Information described the operation as "intelligence-based and selective, " claiming over 70 militants were killed in the strikes in retaliation to the series of attacks on Pakistani soil, the February 6 suicide bombing at a Shia mosque in Islamabad in which 32 people died and many were injured being the most notable.

The Taliban government in Kabul has strongly criticised these strikes, calling them a serious breach of the sovereignty of Afghanistan. They reported at least 17 civilian casualties, including women and children, in the areas of Behsud and Barmal. The Afghan government denies that militants have been targeted and claims that the airstrikes have hit homes, a madrasa, and a mosque during the holy month of Ramadan. They have lodged a formal complaint through diplomatic channels and have given an assurance of a "calculated response at an appropriate time" as a result of their protest.

This episode is the latest escalation in a relationship that has deteriorated steadily since the Taliban’s return to power in 2021. Pakistan has repeatedly argued that TTP members use Afghan land as a safe haven, from where they have perpetrated cross border terrorist attacks resulting in the loss of hundreds of Pakistani lives in recent years. Kabul, however, rejects the accusation of harbouring such groups and charges Islamabad with attempting to mask its domestic failures by raising security issues, while at the same time bringing up such unresolved matters as the Durand Line.

From a strategic point of view, any military actions taken without the agreement of the other party; no matter how targeted, always entail certain risks in this region. Pakistani authorities claiming self defence is reasonable as the threat was imminent; however, past experiences should serve as a warning. Earlier cross border raids, for example, those carried out in the middle of the 2000s, may have resulted in tactical success but they often had the effect of increased recruitment into militant networks, the displacement of local people, and the deepening of the anti-Pakistan sentiment in Afghanistan. Hence, the present attacks, happening during Ramadan and with the news of civilian casualties, may not only lessen the effects of these measures but also put Pakistan's overall diplomatic position in jeopardy.

In addition, the issue of the operation signifies the ineffectiveness of using military force only against what is essentially a political and regional problem. The comeback of the TTP is linked with the lack of governance in Afghanistan, the existence of spaces outside the control of the state, and also the complex internal Taliban personal dynamics. Hence, the application of coercive force could result only in a temporary disruption of the militants infrastructure, but if it is not accompanied by diplomatic steps which could be in the form of a renewed mediation by Qatar, Turkey, or China— it is unlikely to alter Kabul’s calculus fundamentally.

Beyond the tactical calculus lies a deeper imperative for Pakistan to reconsider its overarching paradigm toward Afghanistan. For decades, policy has oscillated between strategic depth ambitions and reactive securitisation of border threats, often treating the neighbour as an extension of Pakistan’s internal security apparatus rather than a sovereign entity with its own agency and vulnerabilities. This mindset has perpetuated mutual suspicion and limited space for genuine cooperation. One cannot help but reflect on how persistently we return to the same instruments of coercion, expecting different outcomes.

Pakistan’s security imperatives are legitimate and pressing. Yet true resolution demands recognising that coercion alone rarely resolves deep-seated neighbourly dilemmas. As the dust settles along the Durand Line, one is left to ponder whether we are condemned to repeat the familiar cycle of retaliation and recrimination, or whether this moment might finally compel a more sober reckoning with the limits of force and the possibilities of patience. The challenge for policymakers in Islamabad remains to convert tactical necessity into strategic foresight— lest repeated cycles of strike and counter-strike entrench instability for yet another generation.

A shift toward a more integrative framework— one that acknowledges shared Pashtun cultural ties, economic interdependencies, and common interests in countering extremism— could yield greater dividends. Such an approach would require Islamabad to invest in confidence-building measures, support Afghan economic stabilisation where feasible, and pursue multilateral forums to address terrorism without unilateral escalation. Only by moving beyond coercion to structured engagement can Pakistan hope to transform a perennial source of insecurity into a stabilising neighbour.

The regional fallout merits equal consideration. India has already seized the moment to criticise Pakistan, framing the strikes as an attempt to “externalise internal failures” and reaffirming support for Afghan territorial integrity. Such rhetoric risks entrenching proxy narratives in South Asia at a time when multiple fronts already strain Pakistan’s security apparatus. Economic interdependence along the border— disrupted repeatedly by closures at Torkham and Chaman— further compounds the stakes for both nations.

A more sustainable path forward requires Islamabad to recalibrate its strategy toward a dual-track approach: maintaining credible deterrence while investing in dialogue. The central problem to this issue is the TTP. The TTP has become the main obstacle for any genuine peace process between the two countries. The TTP is a banned terrorist group that was formed in 2007. It has an ideological affiliation with the Afghan Taliban.

The TTP has taken advantage of Afghanistan's weak border control and lack of government to carry out continuous attacks on Pakistan targets. This has resulted in a breakdown of trust and has undermined the diplomatic efforts. The group also discredits Kabul's commitment to regional stability by their ability to reassemble and increase their terrorist activities after 2021. The assault was reminiscent of the series of terror tactics the TTP has deployed where the latter was associated with, but did not officially claim, the February 6 suicide bombing at a Shia mosque in Islamabad which killed 32 and directly led to the recent airstrikes. It is a clear demonstration that such heinous acts prevent attempts to reduce tensions and slowly move towards peace.

Unwavering, tangible, and transparent agreements from Kabul to rid the TTP of its safe havens, along with border control exercised through cooperative arrangements and the sharing of intelligence, are the only feasible ways to a decrease in hostilities. The international community should make their assistance dependent on verifiable outcomes in fighting terrorism, particularly those that are geared towards Afghan stability. 

Pakistan’s security imperatives are legitimate and pressing. Yet true resolution demands recognising that coercion alone rarely resolves deep-seated neighbourly dilemmas. As the dust settles along the Durand Line, one is left to ponder whether we are condemned to repeat the familiar cycle of retaliation and recrimination, or whether this moment might finally compel a more sober reckoning with the limits of force and the possibilities of patience. The challenge for policymakers in Islamabad remains to convert tactical necessity into strategic foresight— lest repeated cycles of strike and counter-strike entrench instability for yet another generation.