The Caliph-less century

AT PENPOINT

When exactly did the Caliphate come to an end? The abolition by the Turkish Grand National Assembly took place on 3 March 1924, which corresponded to 30 Rajab 1342. The official calendar of the Osmanli Caliphate, and for the beginning of the succeeding Turkish Republic, was the Rumi calendar, which corresponded to the Gregorian calendar, but which began with the Hijra. According to it, the date was 3 Mart 1340. Like the Osmanlis, the Rumi calendar has ended up on the dust heap of history. This calendar had been introduced during the Tanzimat reforms in 1840.

The Hijri calendar seems most appropriate for the abolition of an institution so inextricably bound up with Islam. Therefore, it seems appropriate to mark the centenary of its abolition on 30 Rajab 1442, which will fall next Friday (if the month runs to 30 days), rather than 3 March 2024, which will also be 3 Mart 2340.

When the Caliphate was abolished, the Osmanli Sultan had become just one among the monarchs of Europe. Yet the prestige of the office was such that it caused widespread upheavals in the entire Muslim world, and there was a Khilafat.

Movement in India. The Ali Brothers, who led this Movement, were put on trial for a sin the Raj deemed unforgivable: trying to suborn the loyalty of Indian Muslim troops, through a pamphlet they tried to distribute among Indian troops heading for deployment in the Middle EastAt this point, the Osmanli Caliphate had lost World War I. Perhaps nothing illustrates the changed position of the Caliphate than Osmanli participation in the War, where it was one of three Allies, along with Germany and Austria. The upheaval was not because the Osmanli Sultanate was abolished, but that the Caliphate had been.

The Caliphate, at that point, had been a continuously held office, which dated back to the passing of the Holy Prophet (Peace Be Upon Him), after whom it was instituted. The first four Caliphs are described as Rightly Guided, and were all Companions of the Holy Prophet (PBUH). Though all belonged to the Quresh, they were not related to one another, and it was left to the Umayyid dynasty to introduce the hereditary principle.

The Umayyids were ousted forcibly the Abbasids. Theyy held the Caliphate the longest, from 750 AD, when it replaced the Ummayyids to 1516, when it handed over to the Osmanlis. It was also the dynasty which experienced the greatest decline of the office, and some sacralisation. It should be noted that the Caliphate was not a religious office like the Papacy. True, the Caliph was a requirement, but that was because all human activity was supposed to be governed by Islam, and that included how society was to be ruled.

The Muslim world has never gone this long without a Caliph, and the fact reflects not just the forces arrayed against this (which include all governments), but also that Muslims do not value the institution. The Caliphate was monarchical in the age of monarchy, and it would have to win consent, even it be only minimal, in this age of democracy.

The Caliph was supposed to be for all Muslims, which meant they were supposed to part of the same state. This was the pattern under the Rightly Guided Caliphs, the Ummayids and the early Abbasids. But it is possible to see a decline in this control under the Abbasids. The first part of the Caliphate not to obey the Caliph was Spain, where an Ummayyid Prince fled and became an independent Amir. More typical were the Tulunid rulers of Egypt, who never claimed to be anything more than the Caliphs’ walis, or governors, but who not only remained in office for long periods, but where son succeeded father.

This fiction was virtually all that the Abbasid Caliphs were left with, as the institution passed through a period where Caliphs were made and unmade, sometimes assassinated, and even dragged through the streets of Baghdad. However, Caliphs were apparently needed as a means of legitimation.

This might explain why the institution was revived after the first fell, in 1258, when the Abbasid Caliph was killed with an estimated 90,000 others. The Caliphate remained vacant for three years, until in 1261, an Abbasid claimant was installed in Cairo, and was maintained by the Mamluk rulers of Egypt. It was this Cairo Caliphate the Sultans of Delhi had to do with, who legitimated their rule as their governors.

The theory was that the local ruler was one of the Caliph’s governors. Increasingly, the governor happened to be a Turk military man. In fact, the Mamluk rulers of Egypt kept the Caliph on hand to legitimate them when the favoured means of transfer of power was carried out, which was a military coup. Ultimately, the Turkish military man par excellence, the Ottoman Sultan, swept aside the Mamluks and conquered Egypt. He took the Abbasid Caliph with him to Istanbul, deposed him and became Caliph himself.

A major change came when the Mughal Emperor did not bother obtaining that legitimation. The Emperor Akbar claimed to be Caliph in his kingdom, but not anywhere else. It was with the end of the Mughal dynasty in the 1857 War of Independence that Muslims in India had to deal with the bare minimum issue. They needed to acknowledge a Caliph in the Friday sermons, so that the prayers would be valid. Thus at the time that the Caliphate was at its lowest ebb, something shown by its continuous loss of territory in Europe, the British suddenly developed an interest in the preservation of the Caliphate, because of their Indian Muslim subjects. They had other interests in the Caliphate, but then came the Sykes-Picot Agreement.

Perhaps the Jewish homeland issue showed why the Caliphate had to be abolished, apart from any residual Crusader sentiments (which could not be ignored, not with the prevalence of Evangelicalism in the British Army in the Victorian era). Sultan Abdul Hamid II refused the Zionist offer to pay off the Osmanli national debt in return for Palestine. The British and French promised a Jewish homeland, but that would require the break-up of the Osmanli state. That is what happened, though its demise had been predicted long before.

At present, with nationalism the prevalent ideology, the restoration of the Caliphate seems risible. However, the OIC’s existence shows there is sufficient sense of Muslim unity that ex-colonial governments proffer it as a sort of substitute. A Caliphate would have much on its plate; Palestine, Kashmir, the Rohingya, the Uighur, Syria, the Kurds, Afghanistan, are all issues which it would have to deal with if it was to have any credibility.

It would not be restored if it was merely to perpetuate a dynasty. There is no restoration movement for the Ummayids, Abbassids or Osmanlis, for example. At the same time, a Caliph is not supposed to be a religious figure, a sort of Sunni pope. He would not have any religious function, just be a ruler following the Shariah. There has been an attempt to restore him as a terrorist group leader, as Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi was, but that didn’t work.

One side-effect would that it would help end terrorism. One of the characteristics of the Caliphate is that it monopolises the right to wage jihad. For example, that there should be jihad against the USA is a given, but the Caliph may decide that that should be later. He may decide on peace for another decade. But he will not allow anyone to declare private jihad, as at present.

The Muslim world has never gone this long without a Caliph, and the fact reflects not just the forces arrayed against this (which include all governments), but also that Muslims do not value the institution. The Caliphate was monarchical in the age of monarchy, and it would have to win consent, even it be only minimal, in this age of democracy.

At the same time, perhaps there is more support for the idea than for the religious parties. The past few decades have seen socialism and now capitalism discredited among the masses, to the extent that there is a demand for Islam, not out of any sentiment, but in an attitude of ‘might as well try it, what is there to lose?’