- Whatever else, the world will change
By: Abdul Rasool Syed
Amid the opacity hovering over the post-pandemic world, one thing is certain, the prevailing global contagion is likely to alter the course of the world. The chronological account of the world fairly reveals that major natural catastrophes have toppled empires and annihilated dynasties; and this ongoing calamity is moving on the same trajectory with similar intensity and enormity. Hence, it is, like other preceding calamities, going to breed comparable outcomes.
The most probable outcome may be the de-globalization and emergence of centrifugal forces within global capitalism. A similar contention was voiced by Nicolas Tenzer, chair of the Cerap think tank in Paris, who argued that the rising barriers in response to the virus will strengthen “the populist and nationalist forces that have long called for reinforcing borders. It is a true gift for them”. Another veteran US market commentator wrote “the coronavirus’ depressing effects on the global economy and disruptions of supply chain is …driving the last nail into the coffin of the globalists”. However, the process of disintegration of the globalized world has, of course, been underway for some time, as epitomized by Donald Trump’s rejection of the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade pact and his subsequent launch of a trade war against both allies and adversaries; Brexit is another manifestation of this trend. The covid-19 pandemic will lend added momentum to this process, by encouraging businesses in Europe and the USA to move their critical supply lines away from Asia and toward local supplies.
The post-pandemic world is likely to accommodate many geo-political and geo-economic changes. It may result in the emergence of a new world order. Therefore, once we overcome the menace of the pandemic, we, as a nation, must revisit our domestic and foreign policies and tailor them in accordance with the requirements of post-pandemic world order
Furthering this strategy, Trump had already sought to decouple the US economy from China by imposing stiff tariffs on Chinese goods and by egging on US companies to dismantle the supply lines they had established and move them home, or to more reliable countries elsewhere. Apple, for example, began last summer to prod its suppliers in China into moving 15 to 30 percent of their production capacity to Southeast Asia. Now, as a result of the coronavirus, US-based multinational corporations like Apple are accelerating plans to establish alternative supply lines outside China or to move them back home. Pressure is also building in Washington for the adoption of tough measures aimed at reducing US reliance on China for security-related technologies, such as advanced computers and electrical gear, and for their expanded production at home.
On the other hand, China is likely to shrink its dependence on the US market and place greater emphasis on clients in Africa and in south, central and Southeast Asia. The Belt and Road Initiative, Bejing’s primary vehicle of trade, is now experiencing a slowdown as a result of the pandemic, but will no doubt be accorded fresh impetus once the Chinese achieve rehabilitation. As part of this endeavor, China is likely to demand greater use of the yuan in trade and development agreements, progressively edging out the dollar and euro.
Europe too is inclined to drift way from Washington because of Trump’s hostility to NATO and punitive tariffs on European goods. European leaders, once the current crisis recedes, are likely to enhance their distance from Washington and seek greater autonomy in both economic and political affairs.
All this suggests that we are going to witness more segmented world in the days to come, with three major blocs or trading zones operating more or less according to their own rules and employing the same currency— the dollar in the Western Hemisphere, the euro in Europe and Africa, the yuan in Asia.
Moreover, the pandemic is also going to serve as a test case for the performance of various regimes and governments. Those who manage the crisis effectively may enjoy an upsurge in public support; those that do poor will lose support and may be ousted. The Communist leadership of China, for example, has come under severe stricture from ordinary citizens over its failure to act swiftly in Wuhan and then attempting a cover-up of its malfeasance; in Japan, more than a million posts on Twitter have called for Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s resignation because of his clumsy handling of the virus outbreak. Iran’s clerical regime may also face a popular backlash for concealing the extent of the outbreak and then responding to it in haphazard fashion. Eventually, every government will be judged on its performance in addressing the coronavirus.
Inter alia, in aftermath of this dismal outbreak, many industries are going to suffer heavy losses. The industry which is more vulnerable and is more likely to suffer incomparable loss is the oil industry. Oil is the most essential and valuable commodity in international trade and its sale on international markets is critical to the economies of such oil-exporting states as Angola, Iraq, Nigeria, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela. When oil prices are high, the leaders of these countries invest huge sums on major infrastructure projects and bolster social services, thereby reaping public support; when prices are low, they are supposed to minimize government expenditures, causing agony and pain for the masses and inviting revolt. With the covid-19 pandemic making economic activity collapse around the world, we can expect a long period of low prices— with severe and possibly fatal consequences for the current leadership of major producers.
Among other global shifts, we can also expect many other geopolitical consequences of the covid-19 pandemic. Among these is the progressive unraveling of the overarching strategy that has governed the US military since the end of World War II. Termed as “forward deployment” and “coalition warfare,” it is the US strategy that holds that US forces should fight the nation’s enemies on their borders. This entails permanent deployment of massive US military contingents in such locations as Germany, Italy, Japan, South Korea, and the greater Persian Gulf— a stance that naturally requires the acquiescence and support of the countries involved. This strategy also requires that US troops be reinforced with those from coalition partners, whether from the NATO countries or under bilateral arrangements, like those with Japan and South Korea. But now, with covid-19, all of this is in jeopardy.
Given the current pandemic, America would like to protect its troops stationed at different places like Italy, Japan, and South Korea, where the virus has been raging and some US personnel have become infected. At even greater risk are the troops deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan, where the communities adjacent to US bases have seen outbreak of Covid-19 as the pilgrims arriving from Iran were severely hit by the corona pathogen. Given these critical circumstances, the future of “coalition warfare” is endangered by the risk of contagion posed by the frequent intermingling of US and allied troops. Hence, the strategy of “coalition warfare” is unlikely to survive in a world of recurring pandemics and withering alliances.
In addition, production bottlenecks. like the ones in electronic manufacturing, have also created humungous hurdles in fight against the new coronavirus. With this new virus spreading, some governments are giving in to their worst instincts. Even before the covid-19 outbreak began, Chinese manufacturers made half of the world’s medical masks. These manufacturers ramped up production as a result of crisis, but the Chinese government effectively bought up the country’s entire supply of masks, while also importing large quantities of masks and respirators from abroad. China certainly needed them, but the result of its buying spree was a supply crunch that hobbled other countries’ response to the disease.
Finally, whereas the Trump Administration has exploited the pandemic to pull back on integration, China is using this crisis to showcase its willingness to lead. Despite early mistakes that nearly cost the lives of thousands of people, Beijing has now learnt how to fight the new virus, and it also has stockpiles of required paraphernalia. These are, for sure, valuable assets for China to exert its influence and regain its lost economic niche in the world.
What happened with Italy in early March is worth mentioning here; when it called on other EU countries to provide emergency medical equipment as critical shortages forced its doctors to make heartbreaking decisions about which patients to try to save and which to let die. None of them responded. But China did, offering to sell ventilators, masks, protective suits, and swabs. As the China experts Rush Doshi and Julian Gewirtz have argued, Beijing seeks to portray itself as the leader of the global fight against the new coronavirus in order to promote goodwill and expand its tentacles across the globe.
The post-pandemic world is likely to accommodate many geo-political and geo-economic changes. It may result in the emergence of a new world order. Therefore, once we overcome the menace of the pandemic, we, as a nation, must revisit our domestic and foreign policies and tailor them in accordance with the requirements of post-pandemic world order.
