From Strategic depth to Hostile Proxy

Afghanistan: the lost love of Pakistan

Naqi Akbar

Things have been brewing negatively between Pakistan and Afghanistan for quite some time. The decades-old affinity between the two states across the Durand Line has now given way to open hostilities. The heating up of the tribal areas, the suicide bombing in a mosque in the Pakistani federal capital, all combined to convince Pakistan to order precision air strikes on suspected terror hideouts.

That was to be followed up in one way or another. The Afghan side retaliated in the night of Thurdsday and Friday, February 26-27, to carry out what it called a few days back tit-for-tat for the air strikes. As things stand at the time of writing, hostilities are at the all-time high; with possible diplomatic intervention from the Gulf states, concerned about a ‘Muslim fighting a Muslim’.

There is an inherent temptation among the better placed neighbours to tutor a weak neighbour beyond the prescribed limit; the Syria of the 1970s to 2005 was such an example in the context of Lebanon, much of the post-2003 Iraqi repulsion for Iran is the result of that; and even the new Bangladesh too accrues its new direction from its decades of experiences with India. For the state of Pakistan, mending fences still is the best option available with a realigned thought process

For the Pakistani policy makers, it is nothing short of a doomsday scenario in the post-1979 era. The post-1979 era it is not a reference to the events in Iran or in Saudi Arabia; but to the Soviet incursion into Afghanistan in the aid of the beleaguered leftist government in Kabul under the presidentship of Hafeezullah Amin, replaced in the process by Babrak Karmal. Despite the fact that at the time of creation of Pakistan in 1947, the issue of the Durand Line has been the cause of irritation between the two states. Despite the fact that after Kabul university, the most preferred campus for Afghan students trying to make it big in their lives had been the Peshawar University. The who’s who of Afghan resistance against the Soviets as well as the leftist stalwarts like Najibullah, all of them in one way or another have been to Pakistan for their studies.

The 1979 events provided an opportunity for the strategic planners to find a common cause with a nation state, which the history tells did not recognize the state of Pakistan at its inception, while another neighbour, Iran, recognized it right away. The war in Afghanistan once over in 1989 after Soviet withdrawal, it was Pakistan which midwifed the creation of the Mujahideen government with different levels of participation from other stakeholder states like Saudi Arabia and Iran.

However, it was known to all that Afghanistan is basically the Pakistani child. The formation of the first Mujahideen government under the late Ahmad Shah Massoud and Burhan Uddin Rabbani and their quarrels with other Mujahideen outside the corridors of power rained the leftover ammunition from the 1979-1989 days on the Afghan civilians in the form of continued strife between the various factions. As the narrative goes, the law and order situation deteriorated to such a point that Pakistan had to again step in in a covert manner and later own its creation.

The emergence of Taliban or ‘students’ in 1994 and their gradual affinity with Pakistan was soon to be a secret, which everyone knew! Those affiliated with news wires can recall that many times in the fight between the forces of Ahmad Shah Masoud and Taliban, mysterious jets would appear from nowhere and be observed bombing the government forces. Practically no one tried to investigate the origin of these jets ever.

The final showdown between the Ahmad Shah Masoud forces and the Taliban in November 1996 finally realized the secret wish of Pakistan, creation of strategic depth. A closer look at the concept points out that the concept of this depth was India-specific. It was visualized that whenever Pakistan feels pressure along its Eastern borders, the push towards the western borders, especially Afghanistan, would be a credible strategic asset.

That aspect can be gauged from the developments in August 1998 when for the first time the USA confronted Osama Bin Laden and fired missiles on his hide outs. A diplomatic cable datelined US Mission in Islamabad, sent on 9 September 1998, did not hide the fact that the persons killed in US strikes on Al Qaeda hide outs included among others 20 Pakistani militants from an extremist organization having known enmity with Iran and the minority Muslim Shia sect in Pakistan. 

That aspect corroborated with the on ground situation then in Pakistan, and clearly showed that the Pakistani law enforcement agencies allowed these outfits to cross over to Afghanistan in support of the Taliban government. The same cozy sentiment between the militant outfits and Al Qaeda could be further authenticated in an account of the Jhang MP and politician in her own right Abida Hussain in her Book the “Power Failure” page 364, where when she tried to condole in February 1990 with a senior extremist leader’s widow in Jhang over his assassination, she was told by the widow that “her brother Osama’ was taking good care and no one else needs to worry. 

The takeaway, the reason a state or an emirate was the strategic depth for the nation state of Pakistan was enough to be given importance even if it meant creating fissures in the Pakistani society along dangerous lines.

However, fate had other plans. The 9/11 hijackings, their impact on Afghanistan courtesy Al Qaeda and the Pakistani turnabout, all combined to make Pakistan lose its strategic depth. The 9/11 line up forced Pakistan to radically shift its stances to the point that it was forced by circumstances to undo whatever it had done painstakingly for decades to create goodwill in Afghanistan for Pakistan. Despite the fact that Pakistan lost much of the goodwill by ditching its allies in the Afghan society and cooperating with its adversaries in the Afghan polity coyly under pressure from the Americans, it continued to accord Afghanistan an important part in its geopolitical calculations.

In 2021 when the Taliban under a tacit agreement with the USA returned to power in Kabul, Pakistan tried to act smart; in a way owning everything they did in Afghanistan. The reason behind that was, it never could get out of its mind that Afghan society could ever be lost to some other stakeholder. However, regretfully the damage was done.

There has been general perception that the Northern Alliance was the only entity hand-in-glove with New Delhi. A gradual opening up of the Taliban revealed that while they respected the Pakistani nation state, they wanted to go it alone when it came to courting other nation states and the Indians were no exception. 

Whether one calls it an over possessiveness of the Pakistani state to anything Afghan, or the Afghans were actually complicit in any great game, many strategic analysts would like the audience to believe, as things stand, mutual distrust and a series of missteps have helped created an adversary out of an ally.

Given the fact that the ongoing frictions between India and Pakistan seems to be renewed after the Sindoor war cry by New Delhi, an adverse Afghanistan border can be the last thing Pakistan can ever wish for. It is always easy to fall prey to jingoism and hate. For any constructive engagement, a recall to the diplomatic mechanism is necessary. Despite the ongoing rounds of fire power on display on either sides of the Durand Line, it is imperative still for the Pakistani state and establishment to ensure that a friendly Afghanistan is at its back; and it is not necessarily an underdog ally, but an independent entity it is own right.

There is an inherent temptation among the better placed neighbours to tutor a weak neighbour beyond the prescribed limit; the Syria of the 1970s to 2005 was such an example in the context of Lebanon, much of the post-2003 Iraqi repulsion for Iran is the result of that; and even the new Bangladesh too accrues its new direction from its decades of experiences with India. For the state of Pakistan, mending fences still is the best option available with a realigned thought process.