AT PENPOINT
India’s armed forces are apparently refusing to buy into the government’s narrative, not so much because it is unbelievable as because they see no reason to die for it. There does seem to be enough professionalism within the Indian armed forces for them to want to win. They have no intention of pulling the Modi government’s fat out of the fire.
The recent licking the IAF received, when its vaunted Rafale jets got shot down, have not just shown the problems faced by the Indian military, but have also created a situation where the Indian Army may not move at all.
If the Indian armed forces had been faced with a weak adversary, they would have had no objection. Armed forces officers dislike fighting, because they know how destructive war can be. Officers of Third-World armed forces are also concerned that the advanced equipment they have is irreplaceable, being more likely than not imported, or if locally manufactured, including imported parts. (The Rafales costing $200 million apiece. That means $500 million gone.)
But the real cost is human. Members of all three services remember those killed in past battles more than the battles themselves. Perhaps that closeness to death is what makes military men fear failure more than death itself. Defeat is perhaps the worst thing that can happen to a military man, because while victory brings rewards, promotions and the gratitude of society, defeat brings disgrace, and jolts to one’s career.
Of course, the lessons of the past, once so important for military men, are of no use now, because the battlefield is nuclear. The senior commanders have no experience of a nuclearized battlefield. It is also a difficulty that a nuclearized battlefield is likelier than not to provide few opportunities for exhibition of the military virtues. It also probably means that the rest of the world will jump on whoever uses nuclear weapons.
The likeliest scenario is for one side to take out an armoured thrust by a nuclear strike. That means that Pakistan being the country without a no–first-use doctrine, it is likelier to take out the armoured thrust India is expected to launch across the Rajasthan Desert, probably at Dherki Railway station, which is the closest railway station to the Indian border. That would cut the country’s communications into two. While road routes would remain, the railways would be lost as a means of transport beyond Dherki. It would mean that fuel for all military vehicles and aircraft would be limited to what was available in store. Nothing could move upcountry from Karachi port.
Of course, the IAF now cannot give the necessary air superiority, which means that large Indian armoured formations will be sitting ducks for the PAF. There is every sign that the IAF has now refused to put planes aloft for fear of the PAF. That implies the Indian Army will simply refuse to move for offensive operations.
Otherwise, to prevent that, Pakistan might be obliged to use nuclear weapons against that armoured concentration before it launched, or at least developed its attack. Once Indian armour was destroyed, it would want to stop Pakistan using its own armoured corps at Multan, and would probably also nuke it. At this moment, Indian planners must be considering which Pakistani air bases could be targeted for nuclear attack.
There might then follow a series of exchanges, where targets would be harder to find as time went on. Nuclear facilities would be hit, as could dams (like Tarbela and Mangla, with India showing in its attack on the Neelum-Jhelum dam that it has no compunction about violating the Geneva Conventions prohibiting attacking water storages or power generation sites)), train marshalling yards, and only then would come counter-population strikes. Even though attacking dams is against the Geneva Conventions (after the spectacular ‘dambuster’ 1943 raid by Britain against Germany), India’s attempt to ‘suspend’ the IWT shows that it can be trusted to fight dirty.
The result of an exchange might well be to precipitate a nuclear winter, where sunlight is blocked over large areas of the planet by the dust thrown up by so many clasts, leading at best to the death of mankind because crops cannot grown, or at worst to the death of all life as the world experiences temperatures close to absolute zero.
As India has borrowed many ideas from Israel about how to deal with Kashmiris, it is possible that India will try to behave towards Pakistan the way Israel is behaving towards Gaza. It has already started, with its accusations about the Pahalgam attack mirroring what the Israelis said about the 7 October 2023 attacks by Hamas, but while Palestine only has irregular Hamas forces to fight for them, Pakistani has its armed forces.
It should also be noted that the initial nuclear exchanges will involve the respective armies firing missiles at one another. The stage of using the respective air forces for delivering bombs is still distant, while the navies do not yet have the capability of a dependable second strike.
Another factor which must be looming on the minds of military planners on both sides is the season. At the moment, the hot weather is beginning, which is not propitious. Not only will troops involved in combat suffer thirst, but vehicles of all descriptions will require more water than ihan in winter to run (the massive fuel requirement does not change with the season). Armoured operations in the desert will simply be nightmarish. The longer India holds off, the less the chances, because India will probably be told by its professional commanders that operations cannot be conducted.
There are sporadic reports of Indian commanders refusing to launch an attack. No professional military man will actually refuse to execute a lawful order, and an order to take action against Pakistan would be legal for Indian officers. Sufficient attacks have been made to show that there is a bedrock of obedience. However, no military man likes orders that involve loss for little gain. ‘Suicide missions’ are left to the movies and terrorists. Such missions are not actually refused. However, objections are strenuously argued. It should also be remembered that the more junior the commander, the more the weight of the commanders above. When a GOC-in-C receives an order, it will be from the COAS, and behind him will be the PM.
Pakistan does not suffer from this problem. Let alone the PM, not even platoon commanders will have to issue orders: they will all be reacting to an enemy attack, and executing plans on how to deal with this.
Most problematic for India will be convincing its forces that they are not throwing themselves on Pakistan in vain. Pakistani forces will be defending their country. Indian forces will be acting aggressively. The kernel of the problem will be that Indian war aims will be muzzy. That is a fatal burden on any military force, as shown most recently by the difficulty the Israeli Defense Forces in Gaza, where they are left to resume their genocide of the Palestinian people. Now the Israeli War Cabinet has expanded those aims to occupying areas of Gaza.
As India has borrowed many ideas from Israel about how to deal with Kashmiris, it is possible that India will try to behave towards Pakistan the way Israel is behaving towards Gaza. It has already started, with its accusations about the Pahalgam attack mirroring what The Israelis said about the 7 October 2023 attacks by Hamas, But while Palestine only has irregular Hamas forces to fight for them, Pakistani has its armed forces.
