The Consequences of Leaving Wounds Open

“If you must wound someone, it is better to kill him” The statement reflects a powerful notion regarding the nature of conflict, especially in its suggestion that merely wounding an enemy whether in or military contexts often fails to resolve tensions and may even escalate them. In this perspective, it implies that if one must strike, the strike should be decisive enough to prevent retaliation or a prolonged cycle of conflict. While the idea may sound ruthless, it offers insight into why conflicts, especially at national and global levels, often spiral when left unresolved, leading to deeper, more damaging confrontations. The principle discussed in the missive reveals a fundamental truth about cycles of revenge and violence, especially relevant to historical and modern warfare. In an historical example, Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor was a significant strike, but not one that incapacitated the United States. Rather, it galvanized the U.S. response, ultimately leading to devastating attacks on Japan. Here, the “decisive strike” concept

emerged: the U.S. did not aim to merely retaliate but to neutralize Japan’s ability to wage war. The use of atomic bombs, while morally contentious, exemplified this approach by compelling Japan’s surrender, a controversial move but one that ended years of bloody conflict and paved the way for Japan’s reconstruction as an ally. Though brutal, the tactic also reflects the argument that decisively ending conflict can spare prolonged suffering and loss on both sides, as compared to an ongoing cycle of lesser strikes. In this light, the statement seems to support the idea that decisive, if extreme, measures can bring an end to conflict in a way that prolonged, lesser actions cannot. This logic suggests that decisive actions may sometimes be employed to end a standoff and lay a foundation for future stability. A military or political conflict marked by an ongoing cycle of wounding but non-terminal blows can spiral out of control, causing even more suffering without resolution. The adversaries, rather than seeking peace, instead prepare for the next exchange, potentially becoming locked in a perpetual cycle of vengeance and escalation, each side motivated by a desire to right perceived wrongs.

This concept resonates starkly within modern conflicts such as the one between Hamas and Israel. The October 7 attack by Hamas against Israel, for example, inflicted damage and loss but was not a blow that disabled Israel’s capacity to respond. Israel, perceiving the strike as a critical threat, has since escalated its actions with a stated objective of dismantling Hamas’s ability to launch further attacks. From Israel’s perspective, leaving Hamas weakened but still capable could mean leaving an adversary who would likely retaliate. Thus, Israel’s strategy appears driven by a belief that completely neutralizing the threat is the only way to achieve lasting security a strategic, if morally ambiguous, pursuit of finality rather than a cycle of tit-for-tat aggression. However, while the principle can be seen as compelling in explaining these actions, it is morally fraught. The

approach described in the missive risks endorsing an overly aggressive stance that might overlook the complex motivations of adversaries or the long-term impacts on civilians and regional stability. Many conflicts are not simply matters of neutralizing an enemy but involve complex political, historical, and cultural grievances. In a world interconnected by global relationships and bound by humanitarian norms, the idea of dealing a “final blow” can have broader repercussions, potentially breeding long-standing resentment, fostering more opposition, and causing immeasurable civilian suffering. Ending a conflict by attempting to eliminate a perceived threat might succeed in the short term, but it can also backfire, creating a new generation of adversaries motivated by the losses they endured. Furthermore, this approach does not consider scenarios where mutual respect and diplomacy might resolve underlying issues more effectively than violent measures. A purely militaristic view might dismiss the idea that former adversaries can become partners or that long-standing tensions can evolve into peaceful relationships. Decades after World War II, Japan became a close ally of the United States, a transformation not brought about solely by force but by subsequent efforts toward reconciliation, mutual respect, and economic partnerships. This perspective suggests that while decisive actions may conclude one phase of a conflict, they do not ensure sustainable peace; true peace often requires addressing the grievances, histories, and needs of those involved.

Reflecting on global dynamics today, it’s evident that many international strategies continue to be shaped by similar ideas of preemption and deterrence. States might choose decisive action over incremental wounding, fearing that a perceived “half-measure” would invite further escalation. This approach, however, remains ethically complex. While some leaders and strategists may find it pragmatic to seek finality, they must also weigh the humanitarian costs and moral

considerations, particularly in an age where public opinion, international scrutiny, and diplomatic relationships profoundly affect long-term outcomes. Indeed, the principle that “killing the enemy is kinder than wounding them” assumes that wars and conflicts are inherently zero-sum games, disregarding alternatives that might foster reconciliation and avoid recurring violence. This concept is also mirrored in the responses of modern command centers worldwide, where military leaders are forced to consider not only their immediate objectives but also the potential consequences of wounding versus delivering decisive, crippling blows. In recent years, nations have escalated their approaches to warfare with advanced technology, cyber capabilities, and other means that allow them to inflict significant damage without deploying traditional military force. Such tools offer ways to strike at critical infrastructures, potentially debilitating an enemy’s ability to function without necessarily causing mass casualties. Yet, even these methods carry risks, as they might provoke further retaliation or lead to extended, disruptive conflicts without achieving conclusive peace.

Dr Muhammad Akram Zaheer
Dr Muhammad Akram Zaheer
The writer has a PhD in Political Science and can be reached at [email protected]

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